09/29 - How conversations about HK end

(Notes from a Wechat group whose members were mostly young professionals and students of my generation [late 20s and early 30s]. The statements below were translated and paraphrased from a heated discussion within that group earlier today. The order does not reflect the original sequence in which they appeared, but each could be seen as an attempt to persuade others in the group to side with him/her.)

1. The economic downturn of HK is inevitable (natural) given the recent rise of Shanghai. The former colony loses its strategic relevance as a result.
1.1 Recent unrests happened because the protestors attempted to "politicize" an economic problem.

2. No, HK discontent in fact stems from mainland manipulation of its economy.

3 (countering 2). HK is in fact doing better than Japan because of its strong ties with the mainland.
3.1 A student of economics cited recent analysis of HK's economic dependence on the mainland, expressing further interest in empirically testing this topic.

4. HKers used to be obedient toward the colonial regime; now the same people turned to their own government in a defiant way, demanding for more than they deserve.

4.1 They are, in essence, former slaves possessed by a false sense of superiority toward the mainlanders.  Look at the prevalent hate speech (the "locust" talk and all) against mainland tourists in the last few years.

5. For HKers, it's all about contract. Beijing promised HK a popular election in 2017, so the people were merely demanding for that. For Beijing though, it's about authority and obedience. Hence there's a clash of values (sympathetic to the protesters)

6 (in response to 5). False. It's not a question of authority, but a question of who prevails over whom. Look at the US in the world.

7. Following up on 6: Our government (Beijing) is tough. It does not make a big fuss over helping other people or being tricked by others. Think of the '97 financial crisis & the central aid to HK. Let the dogs bark.

8. At this point the group administrator tried to steer conversation away, fearing that the quarrel would escalate into personal attacks. A young lawyer objected that each voice has its value. The person who made points 6 & 7 was temporarily banned from the group, along with another ID.

9. Discussion ends with a call for more presentation of "hard currency" (Ch. yinghuo), or "facts" (in English), and the administrator regrets over his intervention. The two people banned from the discussion were invited to join again.


A couple of thoughts:

-- The remarkable imprint of Marxist political economy (part of mandatory "politics" curriculum in secondary and high school) on people's minds.  Result: people were very good at working out the economic underpinnings of conflicts (see 1-3).  They also readily grasp history in a Hegelian sense - teleology and all.  Some embrace economic/geographic determinism (HK's rise and fall vis-à-vis Shanghai).

-- Paradox: Marxism teaches one to understand politics in economic terms.  But my friends (1.1) seem to think that it should NOT be "politicized".

-- Solution: the "politicizing" (zhengzhihua) refers to "making a big fuss" out of proportion, beyond what it ought to take.  If pressed, my friend will probably respond that the proper Marxist analysis of HK's plight must involve some kind of redistribution of wealth, not to quarrel over some trivial electoral matters.

-- Three main uses of history: the trope of colonialism/imperialism followed by "liberation" (4); social Darwinism (6) that borders on nihilism; the essence of "Chinese politics" being always about centralizing hegemony & obedience (5).

-- (4) has clearly been taught in classrooms.  People became rightfully tired of it, and they either resort to (6) or (5).  None, however, acknowledges the push for a more flexible, more liberal political system as a justifiable/realistic cause for collective action.

-- But everybody involved in this conversation, in fact, liked to have a place, a group in which they could speak out freely.  They were genuinely disturbed by the prospect of any major violence.  As well-trained scientists and professionals (many work for the financial sector in New York, or global consulting companies), they also do not object to more "empirical truths" ("hard currency" (yinghuo), another economic metaphor).  Guess there's reason to be hopeful in the end.

1 comment:

Dong said...

Very acute observations about the professional class of this generation, if I may say so :-)